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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine analysts’ incentives to cover small cap firms in the year 2002, a period following 
stock market declines and brokerage firm retrenchment.  Brokerage companies were losing a 
substantial number of sell-side analysts during this period and small firms were having unusual 
difficulty in attracting analyst coverage.  Consistent with analysts’ normal economic incentives 
and earlier research, we find that firm size, trading volume, and beta are all positively related to 
the number of analysts that cover a firm, whereas firm complexity is negatively related to analyst 
coverage.  In contrast to some earlier research, we find no evidence that analysts were more likely 
to follow glamour (or growth) stocks.  Specifically, price-to-book and revenue growth are not 
related to analyst coverage, and recent stock performance (price momentum) is negatively related 
to analyst coverage.  Our interpretation of this evidence is that analysts had reduced incentives to 
cover glamour stocks following the severe stock market declines in the early 2000s, the increased 
regulatory scrutiny of securities firms, and the resulting brokerage firm retrenchment.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
any investors rely heavily on analyst research and prior evidence suggests that firm managers place 
a high value on receiving analyst coverage (Cliff and Denis, 2004).  In the early part of this 
century the quantity of sell-side analyst research decreased substantially.  In the approximately two 
years following the US stock market peak of March 2000, the number of firms receiving analyst coverage in the US 
dropped by an estimated 20% (Craig, 2003).  Research budgets at investment banks fell by an estimated 35% 
between 2000 and 2005 (The Economist, 2007).  A combination of analyst layoffs by brokerage firms and voluntary 
retirements by analysts resulted in far fewer sell-side analysts covering US firms (Leone, 2004).  Two reasons often 
given for this drop in analyst coverage include: (1) falling brokerage firm revenues during a period of poorly 
performing stock markets; and (2) regulatory pressure on securities firms to end payments for analyst research with 
investment banking fees.
1
  In short, there was less money to fund research by sell-side security analysts.   
 
Because of the important role analyst research plays in informing investors, academics have long been 
interested in the factors determining analyst coverage.  Prior researchers have observed that small cap firm managers 
generally have difficulty in attracting analyst coverage (see, for example, Bhushan, 1989, Rajan and Servaes, 1997, 
Barth, et al., 2001, and Bradley, et al., 2003), but reporters in the financial press stated that the problem became even 
more severe for small firms during the period of brokerage firm retrenchment (Craig, 2003, Leone, 2004).   
 
 
                                                 
1 For details on the SEC settlement with securities firms that ultimately banned payment of equity research with investment 
banking fees, see http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
M 
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This study is similar to earlier research that investigates analyst incentives to provide firm coverage, 
however we focus exclusively on small cap firms following a period of declining stock markets, the poor 
performance of many glamour stocks, declining analyst coverage, and renewed scrutiny of sell-side analysts.  
Specifically, we investigate the determinants of analyst coverage for 817 small cap firms at the end of the year 2002.  
We find that firm size, trading volume, and stock beta are all positively related to the number of analysts covering 
the firm’s stock.  These findings suggest that analysts are more motivated to provide coverage for firms expected to 
produce greater brokerage income or investment banking fees.  We also find that the number of major business 
segments the firm operates (a proxy for business complexity) is negatively related to analyst coverage.  This finding 
suggests that as the cost of providing coverage increases, brokerage firms are less motivated to provide analyst 
coverage.  In contrast to earlier research, e.g., Jegadeesh, et al. (2004), we find no evidence that analyst coverage is 
greater for glamour stocks.  Price-to-book ratio and revenue growth are unrelated to analyst coverage.  Recent stock 
performance (price momentum) is negatively related to analyst coverage.  Internet sector firms receive no more 
analyst coverage than other firms.  We suggest that the poor performance of many glamour stocks after the 1990s 
and the high profile allegations that analysts mislead investors by inappropriately promoting growth stocks in the 
late 1990s may have dissuaded analysts from emphasizing these types of firms.                  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997), Rajan and Servaes (1997), Bradley, et al. (2003), and Cliff and Denis 
(2004) all find evidence that analysts prefer to cover firms that they view favorably.  Given these findings we 
assume that, ceteris paribus, greater analyst coverage of a firm is an indicator of greater analyst optimism for that 
firm.  We consider that sell-side analysts may be less optimistic about glamour stocks and less motivated to cover 
glamour stocks in 2002 because: (a) the stock market performance since March 2000 had been poor and the 
performance of some high profile glamour stocks had been especially poor; and (b) the increased scrutiny of 
analysts behavior (by regulators, plaintiffs attorneys, the press, and investors) and the increased threat of being laid 
off likely put more pressure on analysts to justify their recommendations.            
 
Our main focus in this study is testing whether sell-side analyst coverage of small cap firms is greater for 
glamour stocks in the early 2000s.  We test the hypothesis using alternative proxy variables for glamour and we 
control for a variety of firm characteristics, most of which were found related to analyst coverage in earlier studies.  
The factors that we consider are: firm size, trading volume, beta, price-to-book, recent stock performance, revenue 
growth, the status of the firm as operating in the Internet sector, and the number of business segments which the firm 
operates. 
 
Firm Size 
 
Firm size is the total market value of the firm’s stock at the end of the year 2002.  Larger firms are more 
likely to generate greater investment banking fees and brokerage income for securities firms, and several earlier 
researchers (for example, Bhushan, 1989, Rajan and Servaes, 1997, Barth, et al., 2001, Bradley, et al., 2003), have 
found that larger firms attract greater analyst coverage.  We expect a positive relationship between firm size and 
analyst coverage. 
 
Trading Volume 
 
Trading volume is the number of shares of the firm’s stock traded in the calendar year 2002.  Firm’s with 
greater trading volume clearly generate greater commission income, so brokerage firms are more likely to maintain 
analyst coverage for high trading volume firms.  Earlier researchers (for example, Barth, et al., 2001, and Jegadeesh, 
et al., 2004) find that high trading volume firms attract greater analyst coverage. 
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Beta 
 
Beta is the firm’s stock beta, measured at the end of 2002.  We use Research Insight’s beta estimate, which 
is calculated over 60 months (if available) and uses a minimum of 24 months.  Bhushan (1989) argues that investor 
demand for analyst coverage will be greater for firms with greater share price volatility, because the potential 
investor gains from firm-specific information is greater for these firms.  He finds that volatility is positively related 
to the number of analysts covering a firm’s stock.  We use beta as a measure of share price volatility relative to the 
market and expect that it will have a positive influence on analyst coverage. 
 
Price-To-Book, Recent Stock Performance, Revenue Growth 
 
Price-to-book, one-year stock performance (or price momentum), and one-year revenue growth are all 
proxy variables for glamour stocks.  We define “glamour stocks” as those firms having high price-to-book ratios, 
positive recent stock performance, or high revenue growth.  Jegadeesh, et al. (2004) find that, in general, sell-side 
analysts tend to recommend stocks that are relatively expensive, stocks with positive price momentum, and stocks of 
high growth firms.  Although prior evidence suggests glamour stocks are generally more popular with analysts, 
whether these characteristics are positively related to analyst coverage in 2002 is an empirical issue.  After the 
bursting of the so-called Internet bubble in March 2000, media reports that analysts may have misled investors by 
hyping overvalued stocks, and retrenchment in the securities industry, analysts may have had less incentive to cover 
glamour stocks.          
 
Internet Sector 
 
Internet sector is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm operates in an Internet sector.  
Because shares in many “dotcom” firms performed particularly poorly after March 2000, and because these firms 
attracted significant media attention, we test whether firms in an Internet sector attract an unusual level of analyst 
coverage. 
 
Business Segments 
 
Business segments is the number of major business segments the firm operates.  We include business 
segments as a proxy variable for firm complexity and the cost of providing analyst coverage.  As the number of 
business segments increases, the more difficult and costly it likely becomes for analysts to determine a stock’s value 
and provide recommendations.  Accordingly, Bhushan (1989) finds a negative relationship between the number of 
business lines for a firm and analyst coverage.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We gather a sample of small cap firms and data for all explanatory variables from Research Insight.  
Analyst coverage data were drawn from I/B/E/S.  Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing at least one 
annual earnings forecast for the firm.  For the sample of small cap firms, we select all firms that had a market value 
of equity from $300 million to $1.5 billion at the end of 2002.  This is the size restriction that Standard & Poor’s 
uses in developing the S&P 600 small cap index.  This initial screen results in a sample of 1034 firms.   
 
We eliminate from the sample closed end funds, exchange traded funds, non-US companies, and firms 
lacking a sector description on Research Insight.  We also eliminate firms for which data were lacking on any of the 
following variables: market capitalization; trading volume; beta, price-to-book; revenue growth; and one-year 
(unadjusted) stock returns, as well as firms with negative price-to-book ratios.  To maintain time consistency 
between Research Insight data and I/B/E/S data, and for computational simplicity, we eliminate firms that did not 
have a fiscal year ending in December 2002.  (The December fiscal year end requirement results in the loss of only 
seven firms.)   
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The final sample has 817 firms.  The mean and median market capitalizations are $711 million and $634 
million, respectively.  The mean and median number of analysts covering each firm is 7.24 and 6.0, respectively.  
Other descriptive statistics for the final sample appear in Table 1.     
 
Following the same methodology used by Bhushan (1989) and Barth, et al. (2001), we regress the number 
of analysts covering a firm on a series of right hand side variables thought to influence analyst coverage.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 shows the results from five different model specifications in which analyst coverage is regressed on 
the explanatory variables described earlier.  In each model specification, firm size and beta are positively related to 
analyst coverage at the 0.01 level of significance.  Trading volume is positively related to analyst coverage at the 
0.05 level of significance.  These results support research from earlier periods that examine the influences of firm-
specific characteristics on analyst coverage.  That is, these results suggest sell-side analysts are more likely to cover 
firms that are more likely to generate larger brokerage or underwriting fees.   
 
Because of missing data in Research Insight, including the variable business segments in the model causes 
the sample size to drop to 614 firms.  Consequently, we only include this variable in Models (4) and (5).  In both 
models the number of business segments the firm operates is negatively related to analyst coverage at the 0.01 level 
of significance.  Thus, our evidence supports Bhushan’s (1989) findings and the notion that, holding other factors 
constant, analysts are less likely to provide firms with coverage as the complexity and cost of providing that 
coverage increases.  The indicator variable Internet is not statistically significant in any specification in which it 
appears. 
 
Regarding the main focus of the study, we find no evidence that analysts provide greater coverage to 
glamour stocks in the year 2002.  Price-to-book and revenue growth are not significantly related to analyst coverage 
in any of the models in which they appear.  Moreover, recent stock performance is negatively related to analyst 
coverage at the 0.01 level of significance (or less) in each of the models in which it appears.
2
 
  
Our results regarding glamour stocks can be contrasted with those of Jegadeesh, et al. (2004) who find that 
analyst generally prefer to recommend expensive stocks, stocks of high growth firms, and stocks with positive share 
price momentum.  Jegadeesh, et al. (2004) draw a sample of firms from 1985 to 1998.  This sample period permits a 
generalized inference about the typical behavior of analysts, at least prior to the declining stock markets of the early 
2000s.  Our sample data are drawn from the end of the year 2002, a point in time following poor stock market 
performance, increased scrutiny of analyst behavior, and securities industry retrenchment.   
 
The most plausible interpretation of our results regarding glamour stocks is that analysts’ incentives were 
somewhat different in 2002.  In particular, the evidence from this study suggests that analysts had weaker incentives 
to recommend glamour stocks at this moment in time.  Furthermore, our focus on small cap stocks (which generally 
have lower analyst coverage), allows us to suggest which firms likely had the greatest difficulty attracting analyst 
                                                 
2 We conduct several robustness checks that are not shown in Table 2.  For example, we estimate many additional model 
specifications and in no case can we reach a qualitatively different conclusion regarding the sign or significance of any of the 
explanatory variables.  We use the price-earnings ratio as a valuation measure in place of the price-to-book ratio.  None of our 
model estimates show price-earnings to be significant.  We use standard regression diagnostics, such as those identified by 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980), and conclude that OLS assumption violations are not driving our reported results.  White’s 
(1980) test does indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity, but we present results in Table 2 using White-corrected standard 
errors.  We use the Hausman specification test to determine whether price-to-book and analyst coverage are endogenous 
variables.  Using this test we find no evidence of a simultaneity problem.  Although Bhushan (1989) and Barth, et al. (2001) use 
standard OLS to analyze determinants of analyst coverage, Rock, et al. (2000) recommend using a negative binomial model in 
estimating cross-sectional, analyst-following regressions.  We re-estimate the influence of all explanatory variables on analyst 
coverage using negative binomial regressions and the results shown in Table 2 are strongly supported.  All significant variables 
shown in Table 2 retain their sign and are significance at the 1% level (or better).  All insignificant variables in Table 2 are again 
found to be statistically insignificant, including price-to-book (which has p = 0.649 using model (5) with the negative binomial 
regression).          
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coverage after the market peak in the year 2000.  These were smaller firms with low trading volume, low beta, 
positive price momentum, and many business segments.   
 
Using Australian data, Azzi and Bird (2005) provide evidence that is somewhat similar in spirit to our 
findings.  They find that Australian analysts disproportionately recommended growth stocks with positive price 
momentum in the “boom” years of the 1990s, but in the “gloom” years of the early 2000s they moved their 
recommendations away from these types of firms.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We study the incentives of equity analysts to provide coverage of small cap firms in the year 2002.  This 
period followed major stock market declines, the poor performance of many glamour stocks, increased scrutiny of 
analyst behavior by regulators and the financial press, and an industry-wide reduction in the number of equity 
analysts providing research.  Our evidence suggests that several firm-specific characteristics previously shown to 
influence analyst coverage continued to influence analysts in a predictable manner.  Firm size, trading volume, and 
beta are all positively related to the number of analysts that cover a firm, whereas firm complexity is negatively 
related to analyst coverage.  These factors are entirely consistent with the economic incentives analysts normally 
encounter when selecting which firms to cover.  However, we also find that analysts did not favor glamour stocks 
when selecting firms for coverage.  Neither price-to-book nor revenue growth is related to analyst coverage, and 
recent stock performance (price momentum) is negatively related to analyst coverage.  These findings contrast those 
of earlier researchers, e.g., Jegadeesh, et al. (2004), who rely on sample periods ending in the 1990s.  We argue that 
analysts had unusual incentives to deemphasize glamour stocks during the early 2000s.   
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
Shown are summary statistics for sampled small cap firms.  Each firm was selected from Research Insight and has a total market 
value of equity between $300 million and $1.5 billion.  All variables are measured for the year 2002.  Analyst Coverage is the 
number of analysts covering the firm.  Firm Size is the total market value of equity.  Trading Volume is the annual number of shares 
traded.  Beta is the firm’s stock beta.  Price-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Stock Return 
is the preceding one-year percentage raw return on the firm’s stock.  Internet takes a value of one if the firm operates in an Internet 
sector (as classified by Research Insight).  Revenue Growth is the percentage change in sales for the current year.   Business 
Segments is the number of major business segments the firm operates (as classified by Research Insight).  Analyst Coverage data are 
drawn from I/B/E/S and all other data are drawn from Research Insight.            
 
 
Variable N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Max. Min. 
Analyst Coverage 817 7.24 6.00 6.22 35 0 
Firm Size (in $millions) 817 710.77 634.06 331.48 1497.83 302.27 
Trading Volume (in millions) 817 100.60 47.84 202.01 2602.58 0.01 
Beta 817 0.84 0.59 0.87 5.62 -0.61 
Price-to-book 817 5.14 3.01 12.11 210.96 0.03 
Stock Return (in %) 817 -1.68 -4.11 82.25 1971.88 -95.32 
Internet 817 0.02 0.00 0.13 1 0 
Revenue Growth (in %) 817 14.80 3.03 118.83 2337.67 -94.11 
Business Segments 614 2.67 2.00 1.75 10 1 
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Table 2 
Regressions of Analyst Coverage for Small Cap Firms 
 
Shown are the results of regressing analyst coverage on several variables. The sample includes 817 small cap firms, each with a total 
market value of equity between $300 million and $1.5 billion at the end of year 2002.  The dependent variable is the number of 
analysts covering the firm’s stock.   Firm Size is the total market value of equity.  Trading Volume is the annual number of shares 
traded.  Beta is the firm’s stock beta.  Price-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Stock Return 
is the preceding one-year percentage raw return on the firm’s stock.  Internet takes a value of one if the firm operates in the Internet 
sector (as classified by Research Insight).  Revenue Growth is the percentage change in sales for the current year.   Business 
Segments is the number of major business segments the firm operates (as classified by Research Insight).  All variables are measured 
for the year 2002.  Coefficient estimates are shown on the top row for each variable.  P-values are shown in parentheses and are 
calculated using White’s (1980) corrected standard errors.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Intercept 1.848 1.917 1.836 2.252 2.178 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
Firm Size 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Trading Volume  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045) (0.046) 
 
Beta   2.556 2.564 2.535 2.638 2.652 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Price-to-book  0.011 0.014 0.007 
(0.384) (0.269) (0.576) 
 
Stock Return -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Internet 0.486 -0.146 
 (0.813) (0.951) 
 
Revenue Growth 0.001 0.000 
 (0.250) (0.611) 
 
Business  Segments -0.350 -0.344 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
 
R2 0.295 0.308 0.309 0.342 0.342 
 
N 817 817 817 614 614 
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